The idea that only startups can innovate and that incumbents can’t respond is wrong. Apple responds to innovation and, though I hate to tell you this, they are not a startup. They were founded some 40 years ago and have more than 80,000 employees. I think the startup community feels proprietary about them because they still profiting from innovation. Just yesterday they put a score of startups out of business with innovative products. Not products where they came up with the idea first and for themselves, but innovative products all the same.
And not just Apple: Google, Amazon. These are non-startups that appreciate innovation and make money from it. Not that this in itself–big companies profiting from innovation–is new. It’s not something companies started doing after the CEO read the The Innovator’s Dilemma or Ries or Blank. It’s not because those companies have some inbuilt innovation DNA from being started in Silicon Valley or venture backed. Big, established, well-managed businesses have always profited from innovation, even when they are not really innovators themselves.
Looking hard at what’s already working in the marketplace is the tactic likely to produce the quickest results. I call this robbing a few gas stations so that you don’t starve to death while you’re planning the perfect crime.
Lots of companies think that the only good innovations are the ones they develop themselves, not the ideas they get from smaller competitors–the familiar not-invented-here syndrome. In my experience, the opposite is usually true. Normally, outside ideas are useful simply because your competitors are already doing your market research for you. They’re proving what customers want in the marketplace, where it counts.
I’ve found that good ideas come from all over–conventional competitors, regionals, small companies, even international competitors in Europe and Japan. So it may not surprise you to learn that most of PepsiCo’s major strategic successes are ideas we borrowed from the marketplace–often from small regional or local competitors.
For example, Doritos, Tostitos, and Sabritos (whose combined sales total roughly $1 billion) were products developed by three small chippers on the West Coast. The idea for pan pizza (a $500 million business for Kansas-based Pizza Hut) originated with several local pizzerias in Chicago. And the pattern for Wilson 1200 golf clubs (the most successful new club line ever) came from a small, golf clubber in Arizona.
In each case, PepsiCo spotted a promising new idea, improved on it, and then out-executed the competition. To some people this sounds like copycatting. To me it amounts to finding out what’s
with consumers, improving on the concept, then getting more out of it. You can decide how much this idea appeals to you. But at PepsiCo it led to $2 billion to $3 billion worth of successful innovations. And without those innovations, the company’s growth would have been a lot less dynamic.
The only surprising thing about what he’s saying here is that he said it out loud. This is a rational big-company dynamic. When companies that once prided themselves on their unparalleled willingness to think different start to feel the heat of the quarterly earnings target, they get “tough-minded” and figure out how to profit from innovation no matter where it comes from. Because, sentiment aside, why wouldn’t they?
Who Profits, Innovator or Incumbent?
On the one hand the startup crowd invokes the magical specialness of startups as innovators and the bloated battleship-turningness of established companies. On the other hand casual observers and other corporate executives believe that first-mover advantage is a fairy tale for dreamers. Back in the 1990s when I worked for BigCo pushing them to invest in startups, one of the BigCo senior executives loved to say “you can always tell the pioneers, they’re the ones with the arrows in their backs.” He said it pretty much every time I was in pretty much any meeting with him. It infuriated me because I didn’t have an easy way to explain why, though he was sometimes right, he was also sometimes wrong. There are innovators who prosper and there are innovators who get crushed by non-innovative incumbents. Being the innovator, in itself, evidently does not guarantee that you will make money from your innovation. And neither does being smart, being fast, being agile, being lean, being customer responsive, having a better UI, “getting it”, or any of the other reasons usually spouted around. What, then, does determine it?
The neo-Teece Model
There are two primary things that determine whether you profit from your innovation or someone else does2. The first is: how hard is it to replicate your innovation? The second is: what do the complementary assets your business model requires look like and how important are they to the commercialization of your innovation?
First, can someone replicate your technology. Things like patents, trade secrets, and regulation make it hard or illegal for another company to do so, of course. But we know these things only benefit incumbents, not startups. Factors that are more common in the startup world that make an innovation hard to replicate include network effects, cutting-edge technology or a very limited supply of engineers who know how to implement the technology, and user switching costs.
Second: complementary assets. These are the things you need besides the technology to make your business model work: distribution channels, manufacturing capabilities, the use of someone else’s platform (the cell phone network, the banking network, Facebook.), etc. Some complementary assets are critical to your success (you can’t introduce the iPhone without a cell network) and you benefit more from them than the owner of the asset. Some are less critical (it would be great to partner with utility companies to offer rebates on your new smart thermostat, but you could make a go of it without them) and, assuming your innovation is valuable, the owner of the asset probably benefits more than you do. This last part–who benefits more?–does not mean who makes more money, it means who would be worse off if the other did not exist. It also applies per asset owner; per bargaining unit. So Airbnb’s complementary assets are apartments their owners are willing to rent. While Airbnb certainly benefits more from the existence of these apartments generally, each individual apartment owner benefits more from Airbnb than Airbnb does from them.
All companies need complementary assets, but some complementary assets are generic. By this I mean that your startup can’t be blocked from using them. The Internet is a complementary asset to Twitter, but so long as we have Net Neutrality we can assume that startups can simply use these assets.
Let’s apply this to some examples.
|Complementary assets?||Innov. hard to replicate?||Who benefits more?||Can build asset?||Strategy|
|AirBnb||Yes (apartments)||No||Asset owners||No||Partner|
|Uber||Yes (fleet of drivers)||No||Asset owners||Yes||Build asset|
|3rd party twitter clients||Yes (Twitter)||No||Innovator||No||Asset owner replicates innovation|
|Apple Pay||Yes (Banks, etc.)||No||Asset owners||No||Partner|
(In the last example I used Farmville, not Zynga, the company that developed it. Zynga itself is in a situation similar to the 3rd party Twitter clients, but Farmville the product had user lock-in, so Facebook preferred to partner than replicate.)
Most complementary assets are owned by some large firm. When the innovation is valuable in itself (so, more valuable than the complementary assets) but is also easy to replicate, the large firm owner of the asset is better served by replicating the innovation and rolling it out themselves. And this is what they do. This is why Pebble is screwed.
When the owner of critical complementary assets decides to compete with you, you’ve got trouble. It doesn’t mean you disappear entirely–TweetDeck still exists–it just means you’ve got to compete to survive. That’s the worst outcome here. The best outcome is when you have an innovation that’s hard to replicate and needs no (non-generic) complementary assets. Then you don’t need to divvy up the value created with any partners and you can count on not having to compete for a while. When that’s the case you can spend your early years getting as large as you can, knowing you can always turn on the revenue later. That’s the best place to be.
Facebook, notably, does not seem to operate in the hard-nosed way strategy would dictate. As the owner of a major complementary asset, they should be replicating innovations far more often than they do. That they don’t is a boon to entrepreneurs trying to sell their companies to them, but not one I expect to last.
The Full-stack Startup
As Chris Dixon has written, many startups today are becoming “full-stack startups.” The reason this is happening more today than before is that innovations are becoming easier to replicate as the major technologies they are built on are aging. At the same time, the few niches where no complementary assets are required have filled up. You are left with opportunities that require either partnering with the owners of complementary assets or building those assets yourself. When you build the assets yourself, you’re a full-stack startup.
This is a bad strategy for the entrepreneur. Being an expert at your innovation is one thing; being an expert at that and also at operating the complementary assets is another. Building complementary assets also requires money, often a lot of it. Both of these things are okay for the venture capitalist: they like to invest money and can always swap in new talent when it’s needed. But for the entrepreneur that means dilution and being replaced.
The best way to counteract this is to look for innovative ideas that take advantage of new technologies. These are more likely to be difficult to replicate and to have more opportunities to build something with no or few complementary assets.
If you’re evaluating startup ideas or are early in your company’s life, it pays to figure out which strategy applies to you and whether you can change your idea to one with a more promising strategy. It’s nice to be remembered as an innovator, but it’s nicer to be remembered as a rich innovator.
Harvard Business Review – May-June 1988 – Vol. 66, no. 3 ↩
This analysis adapted from Teece, D. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 22, 112-113 (1993). PDF here. ↩